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Hobbs 2 
I. Introduction 
In 1889, Joseph Conrad’s infamous novel Heart of Darkness gave the world a glimpse of 
the horrors unfolding in King Leopold’s Congo. Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost, a 
historical telling of the development of the Belgian king’s hold over the territory in the late 19th 
Century, unearthed a rare testimonial from a Congolese willing to speak out against the 
atrocities. “From all the bodies killed in the field, you had to cut off the hands. He wanted to see 
the number of hands cut off by each soldier, who had to bring them in baskets. […] Rubber 
caused these torments; that’s why we no longer want to hear its name spoken,” said the survivor 
of Leopold’s Congo during an interview recorded in the 1950’s.1 Beginning in 1885, the Congo 
became the personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium, who amassed a great personal 
fortune from the extraction of Congolese rubber. The profits from Leopold’s venture were, 
however, based on the forced labor of the Congolese people. In the early 1900’s, a publicity 
campaign revealing the atrocities in the Congo forced Leopold to turn over control of the 
territory to Belgium.2 However, by the time the Belgians took control of the Congo in 1908, 
almost 10 million Congolese had perished as a direct result of Leopold’s policies.3 
Over fifty years later, Dr. Ralph Bunche proclaimed 1960 as the “year of Africa.”4 
Bunche, then working as the United Nations Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, coined the 
phrase in February 1960 when he was representing the UN at a symposium held at Wellesley 
College about the future of Africa.5 Explaining why he believed 1960 would be the “year of 
Africa,” Bunche said that the UN was anticipating between four to eight new member states to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa 
2 Ibid., 233. 
3 Ibid., 233. 
4 Paul Hoffman, "Bunche says ’60 is Year of Africa," New York Times, February 17, 1960, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/115051135?accountid=15172. 
5 Ibid. 
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join the UN that year from the decolonizing African continent.6 In other speeches given in the 
beginning months of 1960, he talked about the role of the UN in international peacekeeping. In 
Tokyo on March 25, he described the new concept of a United Nations “presence.” Bunche 
highlighted the situations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Laos as examples of countries where the UN 
had a “presence,” and stated, “The mere arrival of a United Nations ‘presence’ can have a 
quieting effect on the local situation; in fact, thus far in United Nations experience this has 
always been the result.”7 A talk Bunche gave at the Roxy Theater in Springfield, Illinois on April 
8 further described the UN’s role in the peacekeeping mission in Laos. Though the Laos crisis 
had “complicated and delicate internal as well as external aspects,” the UN intervention in Laos 
was successful in calming tensions and quieting the area as a result of the cooperation between 
the UN and the Laotian government.8 
Dag Hammarskjold, then serving as the Secretary-General for the United Nations, also 
discussed the growing number of UN member states in his introduction to the UN’s 1960 Annual 
Report. He noted that the “year of Africa” seemed to be exceeding expectations in terms of the 
number of new member states, as by that time the UN was welcoming fifteen new member states 
from the African continent.9 However, throughout 1960 there were other ways in which the “year 
of Africa” turned into a less than positive experience for the UN, specifically in the Congo. The 
crisis in the Congo developed into a UN “presence” that would become one of the largest 
peacekeeping missions in UN history. At that point, it was the largest UN peacekeeping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
7 “The New Concept of a United Nations ‘Presence,’” March 25, 1960, Box 15, Folder 7, Ralph Bunche 
Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York. 
8 “The UN Road to Peace and Progress,” April 8, 1960, Box 15, Folder 8, Ralph Bunche Papers, 
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York. 
9 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, A/4390/Add. 
1, August 31, 1960, United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS), Dag Hammarskjold Library, 
United Nations, 1. 
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operation to date, involving over 20,000 troops and support from 30 different countries.10 And 
though Hammarskjold spoke of the UN’s work in the Congo as “the greatest single task” of the 
UN to date, he also noted that anti-colonial sentiments and big power struggles over ideology 
were hampering the UN’s effectiveness in mediating the crisis there.11 Nevertheless, 
Hammarskjold saw the role of the UN as one that was to promote independence among African 
nations despite those influences, which he described as follows: 
The Organization must further and support policies aiming at 
independence, not only in a constitutional sense but in every sense of the word, 
protecting the possibilities of the African people to choose their own way without 
undue influences being exercised and without attempts to abuse the situation. This 
must be true in all fields, the political, the economic, as well as the ideological – if 
independence is to have a real meaning. Working for these purposes, the United 
Nations can build on the confidence of the best and most responsible elements of 
all the countries of the continent.12 
 
Three of the people most involved in fulfilling this mission of the UN in terms of the 
Congo were Ralph Bunche, Dag Hammarskjold, and Andrew Cordier. As the situation in the 
Congo developed into a full-fledged peacekeeping operation, Hammarskjold sent Bunche and 
then Cordier, both trusted advisors of the Secretary-General, to lead the peacekeeping operation. 
However, the crisis in the Congo would forever change the lives of these three men. By the end 
of 1960, both Bunche and Cordier had left the Congo with tarnished reputations amid 
accusations of being partial to western interests. In September 1961, Hammarskjold was killed in 
a plane crash in Zambia en route to the Congo before there was even an official resolution to the 
crisis. To this day, conspiracy theories questioning whether complications with the Congo Crisis 
were responsible for the plane crash surround the circumstances of his death.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Carole J L Collins, “The Cold War comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis,” Journal of 
International Affairs 47, no. 1 (1993): 244, http://search.proquest.com/docview/220697194. 
11 Ibid. 
12 A/4390/Add. 1, August 31, 1960, UNBIS, 2. 
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The Congo Crisis, viewed through the lens of these three men, sheds light on the 
confluence of factors geopolitical actors had to navigate in the post-World War II era. The first 
factor of the Congo Crisis was the postcolonial crisis. Political instability developed in the 
Congo only a few days after it formally received its independence from Belgium, and the return 
of Belgian troops to the Congo in the days after independence created tensions within the 
Congolese government. The second factor of the crisis was the growing threat of the Cold War in 
the Third World, as newly decolonized nations were seen as malleable allies in the conflict 
between the US and the Soviet Union. The Congo Crisis provides an example of the intersection 
of these two factors, as the anti-communist Americans were perceived as favoring the Belgian, 
colonial position, and the Soviet Union appeared to side with the anti-colonialist and allegedly 
communist Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba. These factors also came together 
while the UN attempted to mediate the growing crisis in Katanga, a province in the Congo that 
seceded in the midst of the developing political situation. The Congolese accused the Belgians of 
instigating the secession and argued that the UN should intervene to forcibly reunite Katanga 
with the rest of the Congo, as Belgian involvement made the secession an international problem 
in which the UN could intervene. However, the UN dismissed Congolese accusations against the 
Belgians and instead described Katanga’s secession as an internal political crisis in which the 
UN could not become involved.  
The UN’s refusal to acknowledge the Congolese’s arguments led to a deepening rift 
between the UN and the Congo and called into question Hammarskjold’s commitment to 
promoting independence on the African continent free from “undue influences.” While scholars 
have often given attention to the postcolonial crisis and the Cold War crisis, it is also necessary 
to recognize that the UN was not a passive actor throughout the Congo Crisis. The UN’s active 
Hobbs 6 
disregard for the position of the Congolese against Belgium allowed the Belgians to politically 
destabilize the Congo through their control of Katanga. The inability of the leadership of the UN, 
as demonstrated through the actions of Bunche, Hammarskjold, and Cordier, to take a firm 
stance against the interests of the former colonial powers revealed how western interests 
dominated the UN’s decision-making to the detriment of Congolese independence. Finally, 
though Hammarskjold publicly spoke of letting “the African people choose their own way,” the 
way in which the UN chose both to actively not intervene at certain points and to actively 
intervene at other points during the Congo Crisis demonstrated the extent to which the UN 
became an undue influence and failed to fulfill its own ideals by imposing a UN agenda that was 
directly contrary to the interests of independence for the Congo.
Hobbs 7 
II. Ralph Bunche and the Beginning of the Congo Crisis  
 On July 13, 1960, at the first of many United Nations Security Council meetings about 
the Congo, the delegate from the Soviet Union accused Ralph Bunche, then serving as the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the Congo, of colluding with Clare 
Timberlake, the American Ambassador to the Congo, to further the aims of the Western powers 
there.13 As Bunche was American, it seemed logical to the Soviet representative that he would be 
more concerned with the American agenda than that of the UN. In some respects, the Soviet 
Union was right to question American involvement in the Congo. The US had been closely 
monitoring the situation there since before independence, and in the months after independence 
the US plotted to assassinate the allegedly communist Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. 
Furthermore, when the UN became officially involved in the Congo through the creation of its 
peacekeeping mission in early July, known as Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo 
(ONUC), the US appeared to let the UN control the operation, but behind the scenes ONUC 
received substantial financial support from Washington.14 
 Although some Americans were attempting to intervene in the internal affairs of the 
Congo, Ralph Bunche was not one of them, and the Soviets missed the mark in implicating him 
in other American machinations. In fact, Bunche would actually find himself at odds over certain 
decisions with the Americans in the Congo, specifically Ambassador Timberlake. For Bunche, 
the Cold War crisis with the Soviet Union was a minor distraction compared to the postcolonial 
crisis he faced in the Congo. Though the Cold War always loomed in the background and 
sometimes was directly discussed, it was postcolonial questions that dominated both his work 
and the UN Security Council discussions in the first months of the crisis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 United Nations Security Council Official Records (SCOR), Mtg. 873, July 13/14, 1960, UNBIS, 19. 
14 Collins, “The Cold War comes to Africa,” 256. 
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When the Congolese army mutinied only a few days after independence, Belgian troops 
invaded under the guise of maintaining law and order, which prompted President Joseph 
Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to appeal for a UN intervention. It was also 
during this time that the province of Katanga seceded from the Congolese Central Government 
under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. The Congolese Central Government’s appeal to the UN 
implicated the Belgians as the orchestrator of Katanga’s secession and requested assistance to 
protect the entire territory of the Congo against external aggression by the Belgians.15 This 
appeal concerning Katanga set the scene for the issue that would come to dominate the Congo 
over the coming months and years, and it was the main issue that both Bunche and the Security 
Council faced in the first months of the crisis. While the Congolese maintained that Katanga was 
an international issue due to Belgian involvement, the UN and the western powers maintained 
that it was a domestic conflict to which the UN could not be party. Both Bunche and the Security 
Council’s inability to recognize Belgian influence in Katanga created tensions with the 
Congolese Central Government, and Lumumba in particular, that hindered the overall ability of 
the UN to mediate the crisis in the Congo. 
 From the beginning, the Congo was not properly prepared for independence. As Ralph 
Bunche said in November 1960, “No colonial people […] was ever so ill-prepared for 
independence as the Congolese.”16 That same month, Andrew Cordier similarly critiqued the 
Belgians, saying, “If the Belgians did not train anyone by 1960, they would not have trained 
anyone by 1965. The record of Belgium is not good.”17 Though the worst atrocities against the 
Congolese ended when the country became an official colony rather than a domain of the king in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 United Nations Security Council (S), S/4382, July 13, 1960, UNBIS. 
16 Note verbale dated 16 November 1960 from the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General, Series 370, Box 7, File 4, Ralph Bunche Congo Files, UN Archives, New York. 
17 Note verbale dated 2 November 1960 from the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, Series 370, Box 7, File 4, Ralph Bunche Congo Files, UN Archives, New York. 
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1908, the Congolese were treated as second-class citizens compared to the Belgians in the 
Congo. Belgium prevented blacks from accessing most educational opportunities and 
government positions.18 Until 1957 the Congolese were prohibited from voting and forming 
political parties, and prohibitions on free speech, travel, and assembly were maintained until 
independence in 1960.19 Belgium also unevenly developed mining, agricultural, and commercial 
interests across the country, creating great discrepancies between the economic capabilities of 
different areas of the Congo.20 In 1960 there were still no African officers in the Congolese 
army, and only 16 people out of a population of 13.5 million had university degrees.21 Thomas 
Kanza, one of the few college graduates in the Congo at the time of independence who would go 
on to become the Congo’s first representative to the UN, said that the Belgians “decided to 
concede […] an independence [that was] rotten at the roots.”22 
Despite Belgium’s willingness to publicly see the independence of the Congo, the 
Belgian political elite attempted to negotiate in private for a Congolese government that would 
be friendly to Belgian interests. Philippe de Seynes, the UN Under-Secretary for Economic and 
Social Affairs, wrote to Bunche in the days before Congolese independence saying, “The 
Belgians are disposed to continue to play an important part in economy and administration.”23 
Though the Belgians, and King Baudouin in particular, attempted to prevent Lumumba from 
having a prominent role in the new Congolese government as they believed he was a threat to 
western interests, his party won a significant number of seats in the pre-independence elections.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Collins, “The Cold War comes to Africa,” 248. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 304. 
22 Thomas Kanza, Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
89. 
23 Philippe de Seynes to Ralph Bunche, June 27, 1960, Series 370, Box 12, File 4, Ralph Bunche Congo 
Files, UN Archives, New York. 
24 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, 97. 
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Lumumba was a former postal worker who gained political power in the pre-independence 
period. The Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), which he founded in 1958, was distinct 
among the political parties in the Congo given its national aims and its rejection of tribal 
loyalties.25 The only other national party was the Parti National du Progrès (PNP), which was 
openly supported by the Belgian administration.26 The Belgians expected the PNP to win a 
significant number of seats in the pre-independence parliamentary elections, and they were 
shocked by the PNP’s dismal performance and the MNC’s electoral success.27 Rumors had 
begun to circulate in Belgium that Lumumba had communist sympathies, and the Belgians were 
dismayed at the prospect of an anti-colonial communist having significant power in the new 
Congolese government.28 As a result of the MNC’s electoral success, Lumumba was selected as 
Prime Minister while Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the regional but powerful ABAKO party, 
became President.29 Nevertheless, even before the Congolese government was officially granted 
independence there were already deep tensions and mounting distrust between its leaders and its 
former colonizer. 
Belgium was not the only country that attempted to wield influence throughout the 
process of forming the postcolonial Congolese government, however, as both the US and the 
Soviet Union monitored the situation in the Congo very closely in the pre-independence period. 
The US had a financial and national security stake in the Congo in that it provided certain 
materials necessary for American nuclear and aerospace industries.30 The American perception 
of the communist threat was shaped by a memorandum written by the Department of State in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid., 35.	  
26 Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, (London: Oxford UP, 1965), 65-66. 
27 Ibid., 73. 
28 Ibid., 74. 
29 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, 97. 
30 Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2010), 81. 
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March 1960 that concluded that the Soviet Union would use the breakup of colonial empires in 
Africa to establish a foothold on the continent.31 The US subsequently dispatched CIA agents to 
the Congo to contact potential leaders, and a telegram from the CIA’s Chief of Station in the 
Congo dated March 21 indicated that the CIA was already considering candidates to support.32 A 
CIA memo on April 18 mentioned supporting an unnamed prominent Congolese politician who 
was seen as working against the Communist sympathizers.33 The memo also noted that though 
concerns remained about Lumumba, it would be useful to provide him with limited funding to 
curry favor given that he was one of few leaders with national appeal and would certainly play 
an important political role in the coming years.34 The US worried that Lumumba was willing to 
accept aid from anyone, which was not an unfounded claim as he requested financial assistance 
from the Soviet Union during the pre-independence elections.35 However, there is no evidence 
that the Soviets actually financed either his campaign or the campaigns of his allies.36 The 
Kremlin announced its support of Lumumba only after he emerged as the Congo’s leader, 
demonstrating a more cautious approach than the Americans.37  
Secretary-General Hammarskjold was concerned about the possibility of a political crisis 
developing in the Congo following independence. He had recently traveled through Africa, 
visiting 24 countries, territories, and regions on a trip from December 21, 1959 through the end 
of January 1960.38 Hammarskjold saw firsthand the rushed preparations for independence in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 28. 
32 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960-1968, 6. 
33 Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency 
(Tweedy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite), April 18, 1960, FRUS, 1964-1968, 
Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960-1968, 8. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 85. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 85-86. 
38 Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation In The Congo 1960-1964 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978), 
6. 
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Congo and worried that the transition might not be as smooth as others hoped.39 On June 20, 
1960, he formally asked Ralph Bunche, then serving as the UN Under-Secretary for Political 
Affairs, to depart for the Congo to advise the new government about admission to the UN and 
other technical questions that might arise in the immediate pre- and post-independence periods.40 
The Secretary-General’s worries came true on the Congo’s independence day, when tensions 
flared at the independence ceremony after Lumumba gave a strongly anti-colonial speech. “Who 
can ever forget the firing in which so many of our brothers died; or the cells where those who 
refused to submit any longer to the rule of a ‘justice’ of oppression and exploitation were put 
away,” said Lumumba, reminding the world of the atrocities the Congolese had endured at the 
hands of the Belgians.41 Though he remained for the whole ceremony, the Belgian king seriously 
considered leaving in the middle of Lumumba’s speech, and Belgian officials were irate at the 
ceremonial luncheon after the public festivities despite a more conciliatory address by Lumumba 
there that ended with a toast to King Baudouin.42 What little goodwill that had existed between 
Lumumba and the Belgian political elite was already vanished. 
 With the Belgians convinced that Lumumba could never be counted as an ally, they once 
again began to maneuver against him behind the scenes. In negotiating the Congolese 
constitution before independence, the Belgians limited the powers of the central government by 
giving significant autonomy to provincial leaders.43 Now, the Belgian government used this 
ability to its advantage and courted Moise Tshombe, the president of Katanga. Tshombe’s 
province supplied two-thirds of the total value of the Congo’s mineral production and was by far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. 
40 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 304. 
41 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, 162. 
42 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 306. 
43 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, 89. 
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the most economically developed area of the Congo.44 Tshombe was seen as the leader of the 
Congolese separatists in Katanga who were ideologically and financially dependent on the 
Belgian mining companies.45 When Tshombe visited Leopoldville in late June, he commented to 
Kanza that he was already considering secession even before independence had been officially 
granted.46 From this conversation with Tshombe and others, Kanza told Lumumba the day before 
independence that influential religious and financial groups in Belgium, concerned that 
Lumumba was a communist, were determined to remove him from power as soon after June 30 
as possible and that they intended for Tshombe to lead the opposition against him.47 Given 
Katanga’s economic contributions to the country as a whole, Lumumba and the Belgians who 
sought to undermine him were well aware of the political and economic instability that would 
occur in the Congo if Katanga were to secede. Furthermore, though the Belgians used the threat 
of communism to incite western fears, the underlying Belgian concern was that Lumumba would 
cut Belgium off from its lucrative financial resources in the Congo.  
 Less than a week after independence, a situation developed that provided the Belgians 
with the cover they needed to bring about Katanga’s secession. Unlike politicians and civil 
servants who were officially independent from Belgian authority, the Congolese national army 
had retained its colonial structure as dictated by the independence agreement with Belgium. On 
July 4, General Janssens, a Belgian, reminded the Congolese soldiers of their subordinate 
position by writing on a blackboard for all of the officers and soldiers to read, “After 
Independence = Before Independence.”48 This led the Congolese soldiers to mutiny against their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 National Security Council Briefing, July 25, 1960, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960-
1968, 13. 
45 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, 136. 
46 Ibid., 179. 
47 Ibid., 181.  
48 Ibid., 187. 
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Belgian officers on July 5, which developed into general riots, looting, and a few attacks against 
Europeans in the Congo.49 Bunche found himself caught in the upheaval, writing to his son that 
though he had not been harmed, on July 8 he had been forcibly removed from his hotel room “by 
gun-toting [Congolese] soldiers.” 50 Beginning on July 9, Belgium sent its troops back to the 
Congo under the guise of protecting the Belgians who remained there.51 This violated the Treaty 
of Friendship, a signed but un-ratified pre-independence document between the Belgian 
government and the new Congolese government under which a Belgian military presence could 
only be reestablished in the Congo after a request from the Congolese government.52 
Nevertheless, Belgian troops began to occupy certain Congolese cities, and intermittent fighting 
broke out between Belgian and Congolese soldiers.53 On July 13, Belgian paratroopers seized 
key parts of the Congo’s capital, Leopoldville, including its airport.54 As the days progressed, 
Belgian actions seemed less about protecting Belgian citizens and more about reverting to the 
pre-independence state of Belgian hegemony. 
Complicating the arrival of Belgian troops was Tshombe’s announcement on July 11 that 
Katanga was seceding from the rest of the Congo. A few days earlier he had welcomed a Belgian 
military force into Katanga, and after his announcement he invited back his Belgian advisors and 
ambassadors who had been expelled from the Congo before June 30, which fueled suspicion that 
Brussels had influenced the decision to secede.55 The next day, Prime Minister Lumumba and 
President Kasavubu requested UN military assistance to specifically combat Belgian aggression 
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and the Katangan secession.56 In their cable to the UN, they argued that UN military assistance 
became justified when Belgium sent troops to the Congo and broke the Treaty of Friendship.57 
Kasavubu and Lumumba implicated the Belgians in Katanga’s secession, stating in their request 
that “the Belgian Government […] carefully prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to 
maintaining a hold on our country.”58 They also sent a request to the Soviet Union asking them 
to monitor the situation in case the Congo needed Soviet assistance.59 Though the crisis was 
precipitated by postcolonial tensions, the request to the Soviet Union added a Cold War dynamic 
to the situation. 
In accordance with Lumumba and Kasavubu’s request, Hammarskjold asked the 
President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of its members to discuss the 
growing crisis.60 From the beginning of the meeting on July 13, Hammarskjold described the 
presence of the Belgian troops as a source of both internal and international tension.61 Given this, 
he stated that Belgian troops were not an acceptable stopgap security arrangement and 
recommended that the Security Council approve the Congo’s request for military assistance.62 
Mongi Slim, the delegate from Tunisia, further argued that the Belgian troops had only created 
more disorder,63 and Arkady Sobolev, the delegate from the Soviet Union, accused the 
colonialists of being “unwilling to accept defeat.”64 Italy and France disagreed with the 
interpretation offered by Slim and Sobolev, and instead defended Belgium’s actions.65 Belgium, 
though not a voting member of the Security Council, was allowed to attend the meeting and 	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explain its actions. Their representative stated that Belgian troops only intervened when the 
Congolese national army was no longer under the control of the Congolese government and thus 
could not ensure the safety of either European or Congolese people.66 He further maintained that 
neither in the Congo as a whole nor in Katanga specifically were the Belgians intervening in the 
country’s internal politics.67 Finally, he stated that it was the intention of the Belgian government 
to remove its troops from the Congo as soon as UN troops could effectively maintain order and 
security.68 
The Security Council ultimately passed a resolution in the early hours of July 14 that no 
member voted against, though China, France, and the United Kingdom abstained.69 The measure 
stated three objectives: (1) Belgium should withdraw its troops from the Congo, (2) the 
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Congolese government, would provide necessary 
military assistance, and (3) the Secretary-General was requested to report to the Security Council 
as appropriate.70 The resolution officially created the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo 
(ONUC), and Hammarskjold appointed Bunche, who was still in the Congo, as its head. On July 
15, Hammarskjold selected Major-General Carl von Horn to lead the military aspect of ONUC, 
appointing him the Commander of the United Nations Forces in the Congo.71 
In addition to the difficulties surrounding the postcolonial aspect of the conflict, there 
were also tensions brewing between East and West. American officials in the Congo perpetually 
wondered which Congolese ministers were actually communists, and Bunche described his 
compatriots in Leopoldville as “obsessed with the possibility of a communist takeover.”72 On 	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July 12, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev accused not just the Belgians but also NATO of 
sending troops to the Congo to crush the Congolese people.73 During the Security Council 
meeting, Sobolev, the Soviet delegate, read to the Council an official statement of the Soviet 
government that accused the US, the UK, and France of being complicit in Belgium’s attempt to 
undermine the Congo’s independence.74 Sobolev further accused US Ambassador Timberlake of 
interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo and said that Timberlake was using Bunche to 
further the aims of the western powers under the guise of the UN.75 The US vehemently denied 
these allegations, with Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the American representative, stating that there 
was no evidence to substantiate Sobolev’s claim.76 Although Bunche was an American working 
for the UN, some of his major disagreements were with the Americans. On one particularly 
important issue, that of disarming the Congolese national army in the wake of their revolt, 
Timberlake felt that disarmament was necessary at any cost, while Bunche insisted that the 
Congolese government had to consent to such an arrangement.77 While Timberlake was later 
implicated in American efforts to interfere internally in the Congo, there is no evidence 
connecting Bunche to that aspect of American involvement. 
In reality, Bunche’s efforts were far more focused on Belgium than on the US or the 
Soviet Union. He firmly believed that the Belgian troops were the immediate problem and that 
until they left the chaos in the Congo would continue.78 En route to the Congo on June 23, 
Bunche had a stopover in Brussels and attended a lunch in his honor, where he observed Belgian 
officials speaking in paternalistic and condescending tones about the Congolese.79 The Belgians, 	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he noted, were especially dismissive of Lumumba.80 Over the course of discussions with 
Belgians in the Congo, Bunche found many of them arrogant and prone to hysterical outbursts 
criticizing him and the UN.81 Moreover, the continuous delays in removing Belgian troops from 
the Congo led Bunche to feel that the Belgians were stalling.82 However, on July 19, 
Hammarskjold informed the Security Council that Bunche had secured an agreement with the 
Belgians in which Belgian forces would be completely withdrawn from the Leopoldville area by 
July 23.83 
Nevertheless, the continued presence of the Belgian troops was straining relations 
between Bunche and Lumumba. On July 18, Lumumba presented Bunche with a series of 
ultimatums, declaring that the Congolese government would appeal to the Soviet Union for 
assistance if all Belgians troops in the Congo were not withdrawn within 48 hours.84 When 
Bunche brought up the matter with the Congolese Council of Ministers, however, they expressed 
their disapproval and told Bunche they wanted the UN to stay.85 On July 20, Lumumba repeated 
his ultimatum over the radio.86 That same day, when Lumumba and Bunche met to discuss the 
ultimatums, the Congolese premier expressed his displeasure that the Belgians would not be out 
of the country by July 20, the date he had demanded.87 Still, he accepted Bunche’s assurances 
that the Belgians would leave by July 23.88 Though Bunche believed that the Belgian troops 
should leave, he did not see their presence as an attempt to undermine the Congolese state. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid. 
81 David N. Gibbs, “Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960-1: A 
Reinterpretation,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 1 (1993): 167, http://www.jstor.org/stable/161349. 
82 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 314. 
83 S/4389/Add. 1, July 19, 1960, UNBIS. 
84 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 313. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 406. 
87 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 318. 
88 Ibid. 
Hobbs 19 
was a fundamental difference from Lumumba’s perspective that would eventually lead to a 
breakdown in relations between the two men. 
By the time the Security Council met again on July 20, UN troops were in five of the six 
provinces of the Congo, with Katanga as the notable exception. The Security Council meeting 
began with Thomas Kanza and Pierre Wigny presenting the cases for the Congo and Belgium 
respectively; both countries had been invited to participate in the Security Council debate even 
though they were not voting members. Focusing on the postcolonial situation, Kanza argued that 
the Belgians were deliberately creating panic in the Congo through their instigation of Katanga’s 
secession.89 Wigny, on behalf of the Belgians, responded by stating that the Belgian intervention 
was purely for humanitarian purposes to protect Belgian nationals and that Belgium was not 
attempting to interfere in the domestic politics of the Congo.90 In terms of the troops, he stated 
that they would withdraw as soon as UN troops could ensure order and safety.91 Despite the 
Congo’s protests, the western and western-influenced members of the Security Council refused 
to acknowledge the extent to which the Belgians were interfering in the domestic political affairs 
of Katanga, which would increasingly frustrate Lumumba and other members of the Congolese 
Central Government. And though the Security Council once again came to an agreement about a 
resolution, this time unanimously voting for the resolution, different countries walked away from 
the table with different understandings of the situation. Neglecting the political interference of 
the Belgians in Katanga, the resolution focused solely on the influence of the Belgian troops and 
called upon the Government of Belgium to speedily withdraw its troops from all parts of the 
Congo, including Katanga.92 
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Despite Kanza’s statements during the Security Council meeting, Hammarskjold and 
certain western members of the Security Council remained unconvinced that Belgium was 
behind Katanga’s secession—a point of view that would lead to increasing alienation between 
UN officials and the Congolese Central Government. In reality, it was the Belgians who 
sustained Tshombe’s secession. The Union Minière du haut Katanga, the powerful mining 
company that controlled Katanga’s economy, gave political support, arms, and money, providing 
approximately 80 percent of the revenue for Tshombe’s regime.93 To ensure Tshombe remained 
in power, the Belgians also financed a mercenary force consisting of 500 expatriates, which was 
used to consolidate power internally against dissenters and externally against the Congolese 
national army and the UN.94 Furthermore, Belgian politicians supported Tshombe’s secession 
efforts. In a radio broadcast on July 21, King Baudouin expressed his support for the continued 
presence of Belgian troops in Katanga, which he said remained there at the request of Katanga’s 
leaders.95 Communications sent in late July by Wigny and Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens to 
Tshombe applauded Katanga’s secession and stated their desire to see other provinces side with 
Katanga.96 It was not until November 1960, after Rajeshwar Dayal, formerly the Indian 
permanent representative to the UN who was then Hammarskjold’s assistant, became head of 
ONUC that the UN would criticize European interests in Katanga and directly implicate the 
Belgian government and private Belgian financial interests in Katanga’s secession.97 Meanwhile, 
the UN’s refusal to publicly criticize Belgian interference in July, despite various members of the 
Congolese government making that argument then, meant valuable lost time and a fractured 
relationship between the Congolese Central Government and the UN. 	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III. Hammarskjold in the Congo and the Escalating Crisis in Katanga 
Hammarskjold’s public statements maintained that the UN should not intervene in the 
internal affairs of the Congo and that Katanga’s secession was an internal political matter that the 
Congolese needed to resolve without UN assistance. In his first report to the Security Council 
about ONUC on July 18, Hammarskjold agreed with the Congolese that Belgian troops needed 
to leave all provinces of the Congo, but he also stated that ONUC “must not become parties in 
internal conflicts [and] […] cannot be used to enforce any specific political solutions of pending 
problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution.”98 After the Security 
Council meetings finished on July 22, Hammarskjold left New York for the Congo to help with 
the negotiations about Katanga. On his way, he stopped in Belgium on July 27, and by August 2 
Hammarskjold publicly stated that he had obtained the assurances of the Belgian government 
that they would fully comply with the Security Council resolution by withdrawing their troops 
from Katanga.99  
Upon arriving in Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo, on July 28, Hammarskjold met 
with officials from the Congolese Central Government and outlined his plan for Katanga.100 
During the meeting he stated that the second Security Council resolution “[left] no room for 
doubt as regards the legal situation; the call to the Belgian Government applied equally to 
Katanga Province,” and he reassured the Congolese present that the Belgian government 
accepted that UN troops would shortly enter Katanga.101 To implement the resolution, 
Hammarskjold stated that Bunche would be sent to Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, on 
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August 5 to commence negotiations regarding the withdrawal of Belgian troops.102 The 
following day, UN military units would enter Katanga as first steps toward implementing the 
Security Council resolution.103 Though Hammarskjold expected this news to be well received, he 
underestimated Congolese frustration with the fact that Belgian troops still remained in the 
country and especially in Katanga where the Belgians were seen as politically in control. At a 
banquet on July 31 that was supposed to be held in Hammarskjold’s honor, Vice-Prime Minister 
Antoine Gizenga launched into an insulting speech against Hammarskjold.104 Copies of the 
speech were even distributed to attendees, which included many members of the press.105 
Gizenga questioned why the Congolese soldiers had been disarmed while the Belgian soldiers 
had been allowed to keep their weapons and said that the UN force was enabling Katanga to 
consolidate its power by not removing the Belgian troops from the province.106 Throughout the 
dinner, other Congolese officials also publicly expressed their disappointment with 
Hammarskjold and the UN.107 Additionally, when Kasavubu met privately with Hammarskjold 
later, he expressed his displeasure with the failure of the UN to expel the Belgians and enter 
Katanga.108  
  Hammarskjold’s attempts at mediation were further complicated on August 3. That day, 
he received a message from Tshombe that stated, “The Katanga Government is unanimous in its 
determination to resist by every means the Lumumba Government, its illegal representative … 
and the dispatch of United Nations forces to Katanga.”109 Despite this warning, the message also 
said that the Katanga Government would be willing to meet with Bunche to explain its 	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position.110 Hammarskjold replied on August 4 reiterating that the Security Council resolutions 
applied to the whole territory of the Congo, including Katanga, and concluded by reminding 
Tshombe that as the troops would be under the control of the United Nations, they would not 
interfere internally in Katanga’s affairs.111 Also on August 3, Gizenga requested via a letter to 
the Secretary-General that three members of the Central Government accompany Bunche on his 
visit to Katanga.112 The same request had been made to Hammarskjold two days earlier by other 
members of the Central Government, but he denied the request on both occasions saying that 
Bunche’s trip to Katanga was only for UN purposes.113 This response infuriated Gizenga, who 
argued that the UN was treating the Congolese like children.114 To Gizenga and the other 
members of the Central Government, it seemed that the UN was replacing their ability to govern 
the entirety of their territory.  
Bunche left for Elisabethville on the morning of August 4 without accompaniment from 
the Congolese Central Government. Under orders from Hammarskjold, Bunche was to negotiate 
with the Belgian authorities regarding the withdrawal of their troops and the entrance of three 
national contingents of the United Nations Force into Katanga on August 6.115 Though there 
were already UN forces ready to enter Katanga, the final determination as to whether these 
troops could enter was left to Bunche. The UN troops were not supposed to initiate fighting, and 
Hammarskjold felt that if the troops were to meet with resistance an additional resolution from 
the Security Council authorizing them to use force would be necessary.116 Nevertheless, 
Hammarskjold had promised the Central Government that UN troops would enter Katanga on 	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August 6, and there was enormous pressure on Bunche to successfully negotiate on that 
timetable. 
 Despite that pressure, Bunche’s visit was not successful. While Bunche’s initial reception 
on August 4 in Katanga was friendly, the atmosphere of friendship didn’t last long.117 After their 
first meeting Bunche felt he could convince Tshombe to allow the UN troops to land, but then 
Tshombe unexpectedly announced to the press that UN troops would not be entering Katanga.118 
This forced Bunche to issue a counterstatement saying no decision had been made yet.119 On 
August 5, Bunche met with Tshombe again.120 Though Bunche suspected that Tshombe and the 
Belgians were on the whole inflating the ability of their forces to resist UN entrance into 
Katanga, Bunche worried that there would still be some violence.121 In the report Bunche 
prepared after his trip to Katanga, he wrote that Tshombe continued to repeatedly warn that UN 
troops would be opposed by force if they entered Katanga.122 Furthermore, Bunche was not only 
told of military preparations that would oppose UN troops, he also witnessed such preparations, 
including men marching in the street.123 None of this gave Bunche a positive feeling about UN 
troops entering Katanga, especially without having to use force. 
The tipping point came, however, with an incident that occurred at the Elisabethville 
airport. When Bunche was meeting with Tshombe on August 5, he was interrupted by Belgian 
officials who urged him to head to the Elisabethville airport immediately because a UN plane 	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carrying forty soldiers that was supposed to land in an hour was being opposed by the Katanga 
forces at the airport.124 When Bunche arrived at the airport he found an “alarming situation” and 
“growing hysteria” on behalf of both Belgian and Katangan soldiers.125 The air control tower 
was receiving instructions from the Katanga Minister of the Interior, Godefroid Munungo, to 
open fire on the aircraft and to place obstructions on the runway to prevent it from landing.126 
Bunche was able to communicate to Munungo that the plane was not dangerous and preparations 
were made to allow it to land.127 However, no one was allowed to exit the plane, and Bunche was 
forced to board the plane and return to Leopoldville without conducting further negotiations.128 It 
was clear that Bunche was rattled by the incident and that the actions taken there significantly 
affected his perception of the situation. 
Based on the incident at the airport as well as his conversations with leaders of Katanga 
and the Belgians, Bunche recommended that the UN halt its plans to enter Katanga.129 As he 
stated in his report, he based that recommendation on, “the unqualified and unyielding 
opposition of Mr. Tshombe and the Ministers and the Grand Chiefs to the coming of UN troops” 
and “the tangible evidence of opposition to the arrival of UN troops in the press.”130 
Hammarskjold agreed with Bunche’s recommendation and subsequently returned to New York 
to call another meeting of the Security Council to pass an additional mandate that would allow 
the UN troops to enter Katanga.131  
In the report he prepared for the Security Council about Bunche’s visit to Katanga, 
Hammarskjold placed the blame solely on Tshombe and the Katangans for the breakdown of 	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negotiations. He absolved the Belgians of any responsibility when he said, “The difficulty which 
the Council faces in the case of the Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude.”132 
Instead, Hammarskjold reiterated that the situation was “an internal political problem to which 
the United Nations as an organization obviously [could not] be a party.”133 This infuriated the 
Congolese present at the meeting. Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, who was in New York to 
represent the Congo at the Security Council meeting, contested Hammarskjold’s analysis of the 
situation and stated that the opposition to UN troops entering Katanga was the result of the 
Belgian forces there.134 Given this, Bomboko said that Katanga’s secession was not an 
institutional or constitutional domestic issue so long as Belgian troops remained in the Congo.135 
Meanwhile, Belgium steadfastly protested Bomboko’s interpretation of the situation and 
maintained that it was not interfering in the domestic affairs of the country that it had helped gain 
independence.136 To justify its position, the Belgian representative highlighted the Secretary-
General’s report that stated that the Belgians had not obstructed him from carrying out the 
Security Council resolutions.137 Though the new resolution, passed on August 9, supported the 
Congolese position in that it demanded that the Belgian troops withdraw from the Congo, 
Hammarskjold’s interpretation still disregarded the Congolese position by placing the blame 
squarely with Tshombe.138  
The Congolese Central Government had been furious with Hammarskjold’s decision to 
halt the planned entrance of UN troops into Katanga on August 6 and accused the UN of 
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capitulating to Tshombe.139 Furthermore, Hammarskjold had left the Congo to return to New 
York without speaking to Congolese Central Government officials to explain his decision, which 
only further aroused suspicions among the Congolese that he was colluding with the Belgians.140 
Gizenga was aware that Belgian representatives had been present at meetings between Bunche 
and Tshombe that occurred on August 4 and 5 and said that this was troubling in light of 
Hammarskjold’s decision to call off the entrance of UN troops into Katanga.141 The fact that the 
UN was negotiating directly with those who the Central Government believed were deliberately 
undermining their independence was straining the relationship between the UN and the Central 
Government.  
Hammarskjold’s return to the Congo on August 10 only hardened the belief among the 
Congolese that he was working with the Belgians against them when he announced that he 
wouldn’t meet with Central Government officials and instead would travel directly to Katanga to 
negotiate with Tshombe.142 However, Hammarskjold agreed to meet with Lumumba in 
Leopoldville on August 14 after meeting with Tshombe.143 Anticipating Congolese anger at this 
decision, Hammarskjold drafted an interpretation of the Security Council resolution that Bunche 
was to present specifically to Lumumba before his meeting with the Secretary-General in an 
attempt to explain the UN position.144 Generally, the memo stated that the UN wouldn’t be a part 
of the internal conflict in the Congo and that UN troops would not be used to coerce Tshombe to 
take any actions.145 When Bunche and Lumumba met on August 12, Lumumba brought up 
complaints that Bunche had heard many times before, specifically, that the UN needed to do 	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more to help him end the secession in Katanga and that the UN needed to remove the Belgians 
from the entire country.146 On August 14, Lumumba abruptly cancelled the scheduled meeting 
with Hammarskjold and proceeded to exchange a series of angry letters with him. Lumumba 
accused Hammarskjold of conspiring with Tshombe and the Belgians and not acting “in 
consultation with” the Central Government as the original Security Council resolution stated.147 
He claimed that the Congolese had lost confidence with the UN and that he would ask for help 
from others outside the UN.148 Lumumba and the UN had reached an impasse. He understood 
that the UN would never blame the Belgians for Katanga’s secession and began to appeal to 
others for help in reuniting his fracturing country. His angry letters had, however, also caused the 
UN to lose confidence in him, and UN officials similarly began to look for other Congolese to 
negotiate with instead of Lumumba. 
Tshombe was also not pleased with the Security Council resolution. In response, on 
August 9 he announced at a press conference that while he would allow UN troops to enter 
Katanga, they would only be allowed in if ten specific conditions were met.149 Hammarskjold 
replied that while he wouldn’t accept conditions, he would arrive in Elizabethville on August 12 
with military and civilian advisors as well as UN troops to speak with Tshombe then.150 In some 
respects, Hammarskjold’s visit to Elisabethville was successful in that he arranged for Belgian 
troops to be removed from Katanga within a week, and UN troops began to deploy to towns 
throughout Katanga.151 However, in other ways Hammarskjold’s negotiations in Katanga were 
not the “breakthrough” that he championed them as. First, though Hammarskjold said he 
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wouldn’t accept Tshombe’s conditions, in Katanga it was widely accepted that eight out of ten 
conditions had been met, which gave the perception that the UN was capitulating to Katanga’s 
interests.152 Second, even though Tshombe accepted UN troops replacing Belgian troops, troop 
removal didn’t involve removing Belgian officers under the direct control of Katanga or the 
mercenaries that Belgian money had hired.153 The UN troops hadn’t ended secession, and 
Tshombe was still surrounded by Belgian advisors.154 Thus, though Hammarskjold’s 
negotiations gave the appearance of progress to the rest of the world, the members of the 
Congolese Central Government who understood the ways in which the Belgians still maintained 
control over Katanga didn’t believe Hammarskjold had done anything positive to expel the 
foreign influences dividing their country. 
Complicating Hammarskjold’s impartiality throughout the decisions he made 
surrounding Katanga was the fact that his private statements as well as his communications with 
the Belgians indicate that he was biased against Lumumba. While he publicly stated that the 
Belgian troops needed to withdraw from all parts of the Congo, including Katanga, on July 26 he 
sent a confidential message in which he described Tshombe of having “legitimate aims.”155 King 
Baudouin communicated directly with Hammarskjold on both July 28 and August 6, arguing that 
the Congolese Central Government should not be able to claim sovereignty over Katanga and 
that Tshombe and Lumumba should have the same constitutional rights.156 After 
Hammarskjold’s visit to Katanga on August 12, Belgian officials gloated that he was “preserving 
the de facto territorial integrity of Katanga.”157 Furthermore, Hammarskjold was well aware of 
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the fact that the Belgians politically controlled Katanga and Tshombe. In a telegram to 
Hammarskjold, Bunche stated that Tshombe was “a puppet maneuvered by the Belgians [and] 
that he took no decision that was not inspired by the Belgians.”158 During Bunche’s trip to 
Katanga, “no official meeting was held without the presence of a Belgian.”159 Finally, Bunche 
communicated to Hammarskjold that “without the Belgians, [Tshombe] would never have come 
to power.”160 Bunche’s telegrams to Hammarskjold confirm he knew the Congolese’s 
accusations against the Belgians were true. However, both Hammarskjold and Bunche had 
become convinced that Lumumba wasn’t fit to govern, with Bunche writing to his wife on 
August 15 that “the insane fulminations of one reckless man” could ruin the UN’s efforts to 
mediate the crisis in the Congo.161 Thus, by the beginning of August when the UN could confirm 
on its own that the Belgians were behind Katanga’s secession, the UN had no incentive to 
remove them from the Congo. Hammarskjold and Bunche’s priorities shifted to removing 
Lumumba from his position of power, and Belgian interference in Katanga only helped to further 
destabilize Lumumba. 
On August 21, Hammarskjold announced that Rajeshwar Dayal of India would take 
Bunche’s place at the end of the month, and Andrew Cordier would fill an interim role in 
between Bunche’s departure and Dayal’s arrival.162 On September 1, only a few hours after 
arriving back in the US, Bunche gave a press conference at UN Headquarters in New York 
describing his experiences in the Congo. Though Bunche said that the arrival of Belgian troops 
was a mistake and blamed the Belgians for poorly preparing the Congolese for independence, in 
terms of the Katanga problem he maintained the UN position that the UN “do[es] not participate 	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in civil strife.”163 Bunche’s comments only further reinforced the fact that high-ranking UN 
officials were publicly committed to maintaining that Tshombe was the sole orchestrator of 
Katanga’s secession. Finally, Bunche addressed concerns about the Cold War crisis in the 
Congo. From his perspective, he said that he did not see a great deal of influence by the big 
powers at this point of the crisis, but he left the option open in terms of whether such influence 
could grow.164 Bunche’s time in the Congo had predominantly been preoccupied with 
negotiating between the Congolese and the Belgians. While the Soviets had attempted to 
implicate Bunche in colluding with the American Ambassador to the Congo, there was no 
evidence to substantiate that claim. However, with Bunche and Hammarskjold’s shift in 
priorities shortly before Bunche’s departure, which involved prioritizing removing Lumumba 
from power, the UN found its aims in the Congo beginning to closer align with those of the US. 
It would be under Cordier’s leadership, then, that the UN would find itself more enmeshed in 
Cold War tensions through its close collaboration with American officials.  
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IV. Andrew Cordier and the Constitutional Crisis  
The UN’s response to Katanga convinced Lumumba that the UN would never come 
around to support his position that the Belgians were to blame for instigating the secession. 
During his August 14 exchange of letters with Hammarskjold, Lumumba had threatened to ask 
for assistance outside of the UN. And in trying to reunite the other secessionist province of Kasai 
with the Congolese Central Government, Lumumba turned to the Soviets. On August 9, under 
the leadership of Albert Kalonji, the province of Kasai had seceded from the Congo.165 Kalonji 
declared that Kasai was an independent state that would maintain close ties with Katanga, which 
fueled suspicions among Central Government members as to whether the Belgians also 
instigated Kasai’s secession.166 In addition to threatening the Congolese Central Government 
politically, Kasai was also economically important as it contained considerable amounts of 
industrial diamonds and produced export revenues for the country as a whole.167 Furthermore, 
Kasai and Katanga were neighboring territories, which led to a large and continuous section of 
the Congo claiming to no longer be a part of the Central Government.  
On August 15, in response to Kasai’s secession, Lumumba asked Khrushchev for military 
equipment to help the Congo maintain its threatened territorial integrity.168 Though the Soviets 
didn’t provide extensive assistance, it was enough for Lumumba to begin an invasion of the 
province.169 On August 23 he ordered Congolese soldiers airlifted into Kasai to stop the 
rebellion,170 and on August 25 Hammarskjold learned that Lumumba had accepted Soviet 
assistance in the form of 100 trucks and 16 planes.171 This worried Hammarskjold, who believed 	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Lumumba’s actions could bring about a direct conflict between the US and the Soviet Union that 
he had worked to avoid by attempting to mediate the conflict through the UN.172 Additionally, 
soldiers began massacring civilians as the violence in Kasai turned into ethnic warfare.173 The 
incidents there only further convinced Hammarskjold that Lumumba was not an inexperienced 
politician in need of help but rather that he was reckless and irresponsible and also the main 
threat to the UN’s successful mediation of the Congo Crisis.174 
Lumumba’s acceptance of Soviet assistance also worried the Americans who had long 
suspected that Lumumba was colluding with them. On July 21, additional Soviet personnel were 
dispatched to the Congo, which the US believed was an indication of the Soviets wanting to 
better coordinate with Congolese officials.175 The US was also aware that the Soviet Union was 
working to establish direct communication between Moscow and Leopoldville.176 The first 
Soviet Ambassador to the Congo, Mikhail Yakolev, arrived on August 6 to formally submit his 
credentials and even handed Lumumba a personal letter from the Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev that expressed Soviet confidence in the ability of the Congolese to expel the foreign 
interventionists and reiterated the Soviet Union’s commitment to provide the Congo with 
economic assistance.177 As of August 11, the CIA believed that Lumumba was moving closer to 
the communist orbit and indicated that his removal from power would assist Western 
objectives.178 That same telegram also reported that the CIA’s Station in the Congo was 
counseling an unidentified person on legal means to oust Lumumba from his position as Prime 
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Minister.179 In an August 18 telegram the CIA station in Leopoldville stated, “Embassy and 
Station believe Congo experiencing classic Communist effort [to] take over government.”180 The 
telegram further stated that Ambassador Timberlake had been consulted about a general plan to 
organize against Lumumba and have him replaced by a pro-western government.181 At the same 
time that the US focused its efforts against Lumumba, the UN was doing the same. An August 
17 telegram from the US permanent mission to the UN stated that Hammarskjold believed 
“‘Lumumba must be broken.’”182 
It was within this atmosphere that Andrew Cordier stepped into the role of the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative to the Congo. Cordier, also an American, had worked for the 
UN from its beginning in 1946 and was currently serving as Hammarskjold’s executive 
assistant.183 Both Hammarskjold and Cordier believed that Lumumba didn’t have a valid reason 
to appeal to the Soviets for assistance, and both men feared that Soviet expansion in the Congo 
would start a Cold War crisis.184 The two men also seemed to agree that Lumumba in the 
position of Prime Minister presented difficulties for the UN, as Cordier privately stated in 
August 1960 that the only solution to the Congo Crisis was a change of leadership.185 
Throughout the Congo Crisis, Cordier kept in close contact with officials at the State Department 
and the CIA, and he shared the general western anti-Soviet perspective.186 He also had a close 
personal relationship US Ambassador Clare Timberlake.187 By the end of his time in the Congo, 
Cordier faced accusations from members of the international community, and the Soviet Union 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Ibid., 15. 
180 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960-1968, 18. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 17. 
183 Collins, “The Cold War comes to Africa,” 245. 
184 Ibid., 255. 
185 Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 17. 
186 Collins, “The Cold War comes to Africa,” 254. 
187 Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation In The Congo 1960-1964, 66. 
Hobbs 35 
in particular, that his time in the Congo had been spent advancing the American agenda, and not 
the UN agenda. In reality, by time Cordier arrived in the Congo, the UN agenda and the 
American agenda were very similar. While Bunche was criticized for not doing enough to help 
the Congolese, under Cordier’s leadership the UN would take a much more interventionist route 
and become one of the parties directly interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo.  
Cordier arrived in the Congo on August 28. As part of the transition, Bunche and Cordier 
met with Kasavubu on August 29. During the meeting, Kasavubu was extremely critical of 
Lumumba, but expressed his support for the work of the UN in the Congo.188 On September 5, 
Kasavubu announced over the radio that he was dismissing Lumumba along with six other 
ministers.189 Within a half hour after Kasavubu’s radio announcement, Lumumba announced 
over the radio that Kasavubu was not legally allowed to dismiss the Prime Minister according to 
the Congolese Constitution.190 He concluded his remarks with a statement that the disagreements 
between him and Kasavubu were internal matters and therefore neither the UN nor any other 
outside powers were authorized to intervene.191 That night, under the direction of maintaining 
law and order, Cordier closed the Congolese airports to all air traffic except that of the UN, and 
on the morning of September 6 he closed the Leopoldville radio station, which was at that time 
under the control of Lumumba’s supporters.192 Cordier’s decision to close the radio station and 
the airport would prove to be the most controversial decision the UN made throughout its almost 
four-year stay in the Congo, and it decisively tipped the balance of power in favor of Kasavubu 
during the Constitutional Crisis.  
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Those working for ONUC in the Congo at the time supported Cordier’s decisions.193 
From the UN’s perspective, the radio was the tool through which supporters could be rallied, and 
radio broadcasts about the crisis in Leopoldville could have spread to other parts of the country 
and incited civil war.194 Major-General Carl von Horn, who was still leading the military aspect 
of ONUC, was a strong defender of Cordier’s actions. Before Cordier closed the airport and the 
radio station, he consulted Horn who said that UN communications had to be protected and 
recommended closing all main airports.195 Guiding this advice was Horn’s worry that Soviet 
planes would land in defense of Lumumba.196 However, though Cordier’s decision to close the 
radio station seemed neutral on its face, as both Kasavubu and Lumumba were barred from using 
the facility, in reality the decision favored Kasavubu in that his supporters were allowed to use 
radio facilities in the neighboring country of Congo (Brazzaville), and broadcasts from there 
would reach Leopoldville.197 Furthermore, even though the airport was supposed to be closed to 
all but UN forces, Kasavubu’s allies were allowed to use it.198 
In the aftermath, the UN justified Cordier’s decisions on the fact that he was faced with 
an emergency situation given that Kasavubu’s radio declaration was broadcast without prior 
warning to the UN.199 However, Cordier actually knew of Kasavubu’s intention to dismiss 
Lumumba in advance. In fact, Cordier met with Kasavubu four times prior to his radio 
announcement precipitating the Constitutional Crisis and explained in depth how UN forces 
would act during a national emergency.200 Before his radio announcement, the US had provided 
Kasavubu with actions to take after dismissing Lumumba, one of which was to control the radio 	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to ensure that Lumumba would not have access to it.201 When Kasavubu failed to ensure that 
Lumumba was prevented from using the radio, Cordier used his powers as the head of ONUC to 
prevent Lumumba from having radio access. Directly implicating both the US and the UN in the 
plan to remove Lumumba was the fact that a telegram from the CIA Station in the Congo on 
September 5 outlined in advance Kasavubu’s plan to oust Lumumba and said that Kasavubu’s 
plan was coordinated with ONUC “at highest levels here.”202 Thus, in making his decision to 
remove Lumumba as Prime Minister, Kasavubu was assured of indirect support from both the 
US and the UN (through Cordier).203  
Lumumba and the Soviet Union were the most vocal critics of Cordier’s decisions. In a 
letter from Lumumba to the Secretary-General dated September 10, Lumumba accused both 
Hammarskjold and his workers in the Congo of interfering in internal affairs.204 That same day, 
the Soviet Union sent a letter to the Secretary-General also accusing the UN of interfering in the 
internal affairs of the Congo. Though the Soviets didn’t mention Cordier specifically, they 
condemned the fact that the UN had closed the airport and occupied the radio station, both of 
which were actions specifically carried out under Cordier’s direction.205 From the Soviet Union’s 
perspective, it appeared that the Belgian colonialists were being replaced by the collective 
colonialism of the members of NATO, a scheme in which the UN was complicit.206 Unlike the 
Soviets’ accusations against Bunche, this time Soviet accusations against UN personnel in the 
Congo were true. 
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Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian diplomat who was to replace Cordier as head of ONUC, 
assumed his official responsibilities on September 8. Under his watch, however, the 
Constitutional Crisis in the Congo would only escalate. On September 14, Colonel Joseph 
Mobutu, the Chief of Staff of the Congolese national army, announced over the radio that he was 
neutralizing the two rival governments led by Lumumba and Kasavubu, and he was closing 
Parliament until the end of the year.207 He also told the Soviet embassy and their allies to vacate 
the country within 48 hours.208 Making good on his threat, the following day Mobutu’s troops 
occupied Parliament and arrested Lumumba.209 Though Mobutu seemed to act alone, in reality 
he wasn’t acting unilaterally. It was the CIA who decided that Kasavubu was too cautious to lead 
the opposition against Lumumba, and they subsequently approached Mobutu, whom they felt 
would act more strongly to neutralize Lumumba’s influence.210 Larry Devlin, the CIA’s Chief of 
Station in the Congo, met with Mobutu on September 13 and said that while the US could not 
support a coup d’état, it could support “‘a temporary government composed of civilian 
technocrats.’”211 Furthermore, Devlin said that $5,000 would be available for Mobutu the 
following day for distribution among his “senior officers.”212  
The US had been wary of Lumumba for some time, and as of a month prior to Mobutu’s 
takeover the US was actively working to remove him from power. The US, through the CIA, was 
actually not just plotting to remove him from power, but was rather actively planning to 
assassinate him. While a later Senate investigation determined that the CIA was not directly 
responsible for Lumumba’s death, the evidence presented did outline a very detailed 
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assassination plot involving high-level government officials. Based on the evidence, it appeared 
that the plot against him began on August 18, 1960 during a meeting of the National Security 
Council.213 During that meeting, President Eisenhower allegedly “expressed strong concern 
about Lumumba,” which was taken by then-CIA Director Allen Dulles as authority to assassinate 
him.214 A few days later, Dulles signed a cable to Larry Devlin saying, “We conclude that his 
removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions should be a 
high priority of our covert action.”215 A CIA scientist produced a toxic biological material and 
delivered it to Devlin, allegedly telling him that President Eisenhower had authorized 
Lumumba’s assassination.216 Though Devlin “took ‘exploratory steps in furtherance of the 
assassination plot,’” he wasn’t able to access him before Lumumba, who was under house arrest 
in Leopoldville at that time, left to attempt to reunite with supporters in another area of the 
Congo.217 Cables from Devlin demonstrate that the CIA was not present at Lumumba’s 
assassination, but Devlin did have some knowledge of the plan to transfer Lumumba to a 
location in the Congo where it was likely he would be killed.218  
Ludo de Witte, in The Assassination of Lumumba, outlined the events leading to 
Lumumba’s assassination as well as how the Belgians and the Congolese conspired to and 
eventually did kill him. According to Witte, “it was Belgian advice, Belgian orders, and finally 
Belgian hands that killed Lumumba on 17 January 1961.”219 The Belgian plan to assassinate 
Lumumba, codenamed Operation Barracuda, was given official authorization on October 5.220 
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After Mobutu’s takeover, Lumumba was placed under house arrest but given UN protection, 
which prevented both the US and the Belgians from gaining access to him.221 When he left UN 
protection to reunite with supporters in another area of the country, he was intercepted by forces 
loyal to Mobutu on December 1.222 On December 3 Lumumba was transferred to Camp Hardy in 
Thysville where journalists who caught a glimpse of him said he looked like he had been 
beaten.223 He remained there for over a month, during which time the Belgians demanded that 
Tshombe organize Lumumba’s transfer to Katanga where he awaited certain death.224 On 
January 17, 1961, Lumumba arrived in Katanga and was driven to a house where he was tortured 
for a few hours.225 That same night, he was driven to a remote location and assassinated via 
firing squad, in the presence of both Belgians and high-ranking members of Katanga’s 
government, one of whom was Tshombe.226  
While Cordier’s time representing the UN in the Congo was characterized by too much 
intervention, under Dayal the UN would be complicit in Lumumba’s downfall by its lack of 
action. Though Hammarskjold later told the Security Council that UN forces could not have 
prevented Lumumba’s arrest, UN troops actually very easily could have prevented the Congolese 
national army from arresting him.227 After Mobutu’s forces captured Lumumba on December 1, 
he escaped the next day to a camp of Ghanaian soldiers who were a part of the UN military force 
and asked for their protection.228 However, the Ghanaian soldiers refused to offer him protection 
on the order of their superiors, and they watched while soldiers from the Congolese national 
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army loyal to Mobutu rearrested Lumumba outside their camp.229 When Lumumba left UN 
protection to reunite with supporters in another area of the country, both Dayal and General Horn 
had issued directives that stated that the UN was only responsible for Lumumba while he was 
under house arrest.230 Now that he had left UN protection, UN forces were specifically told not 
intervene and stop Mobutu’s forces from arresting him.231 The highest level of UN officials in 
the Congo specifically chose to allow Lumumba to be captured by forces that would likely kill 
him. Hammarskjold also had an opportunity to intervene when he visited Leopoldville in the 
beginning of January 1961. While he was there, a friend of Lumumba’s attempted to give him a 
letter from Lumumba describing his horrible treatment at Camp Hardy.232 However, 
Hammarskjold refused to directly accept the letter and instead told the man to hand the letter to a 
private secretary.233 Despite receiving a direct request for assistance from Lumumba, 
Hammarskjold did nothing.
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V. Conclusion 
Tshombe continued to work against the interests of the Congolese Central Government 
for a few more years after Mobutu’s installation in power and Lumumba’s assassination. He 
finally allowed UN troops to enter Katanga without protest on January 21, 1963, but it took until 
June 30, 1964, exactly four years after independence, for the final UN troops to leave the 
Congo.234 Though Tshombe’s political influence faded, Mobutu remained a dominant player on 
the international scene as the President of the Congo (which he renamed Zaire in 1971) until 
shortly before his death in 1997.235 Throughout the Cold War, Mobutu retained American 
political and economic support for his regime by allowing the Congo to be used as a base for 
conflicts against the Soviets in other African countries.236 However, with the end of the Cold 
War in the early 1990’s, the US ended their support for Mobutu, which fueled his removal from 
power.237 Nevertheless, 32 years of rule under the ruthless dictator had devastated the 
development of the Congo.238 As revenue from the lucrative mines was largely directed to 
foreign bank accounts that profited Mobutu and a small circle of relatives and allies, the Congo 
remained economically backward, lacking roads, health care, electricity, telephones, and good 
educational opportunities throughout the duration of his reign.239 
After Mobutu’s downfall, the Congo plunged into civil war. Since 1998, more than 5 
million people have been killed, making it the deadliest war since World War II.240 In 1999, the 
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force of over 21,000 UN soldiers called the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).241 To strengthen MONUSCO, on March 
28, 2013 the UN Security Council created a specialized “intervention brigade.”242 Composed of 
3,000 soldiers and known as the Forward Intervention Brigade (FIB), it is a landmark in UN 
history as it is the first offensive combat force in UN peacekeeping.243 Furthermore, FIB is 
openly supporting Congolese government forces in a break with peacekeeping missions of the 
past in which UN forces had maintained strict neutrality.244 On March 28, 2014, the Security 
Council extended the mandates of both MONUSCO and FIB until March 31, 2015.245 And 
though some have questioned FIB’s effectiveness, others have a positive view of the force. In an 
article in the Washington Post, a Congolese farmer commented, “The FIB is not like other 
MONUSCO soldiers. I see they are strong, and here to help us.”246 
In September 2005, Adam Hochschild wrote an afterword to his now acclaimed novel 
King Leopold’s Ghost. Hochschild described how in 2001, a Belgian parliamentary investigation 
acknowledged Belgian involvement in Lumumba’s assassination, and the Belgian government 
issued an official apology in 2002.247 Despite that step, the Belgians still had trouble facing their 
colonialist legacy. In a private memorandum circulated to Belgian diplomatic missions in 
response to Hochschild’s book, any questions about the book were not to be answered, and 
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Belgium’s current work for peace in Africa was to be discussed instead.248 Like the Belgians, the 
UN is also grappling with its legacy of intervention in the Congo. In 2013, through its 
authorization of FIB which is actively supporting the central government against rebel forces, the 
UN took the step that it refused to do in 1960 to solve the Congo Crisis. While the UN of 1960 
refused to support the Congolese Central Government against the forces working to fracture it, in 
2013 the UN is standing behind the Congolese government. When Hochschild mentioned the 
Belgian apology, he was also quick to note that the US government has never apologized for its 
interference in Congolese affairs or its attempts to assassinate Lumumba.249 He did not, however, 
call for the UN to issue an apology for its role in destabilizing the Congo.  
Ludo de Witte’s conclusion about UN involvement in the Congo is characteristic of the 
perception of the UN’s role during the first months of the crisis. Though Witte goes farther than 
other authors in assigning blame about Lumumba’s death, as his book precipitated the Belgian 
parliamentary investigation acknowledging and apologizing for Belgian involvement in 
Lumumba’s assassination, he didn’t see the UN as playing an active role in Lumumba’s 
downfall. “[Lumumba’s] hope, or rather his miscalculation, that the UN would be forced to 
thwart Western plans, was to be his downfall,” said Witte.250 The way Witte phrased this 
sentence demonstrated his argument that the UN was not an active participant in Lumumba’s 
downfall. Rather, he believed that the UN was not included in the western plans to remove 
Lumumba from power; its only role was to hope that international pressure did not force it to 
stop the Belgians and the Americans from organizing against Lumumba. 
Hammarskjold, Bunche, and Cordier were three brilliant diplomats who did much to 
work for peace throughout the globe. Bunche talked in 1960 about the ability of a UN “presence” 	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to quiet local tensions. That same year, Hammarskjold spoke of an independent African 
continent able to develop free from corrupting influences. However, the events in the Congo 
challenged these three men and their beliefs in unanticipated ways. Lumumba was, admittedly, a 
difficult personality to work with, and certain decisions and statements he made created a 
difficult environment that convinced those attempting to work with him that their task would be 
easier if he weren’t there to impede progress. Nevertheless, much of Lumumba’s hostility was 
derivative from the Belgians instigating Katanga’s secession and Lumumba’s correct belief that 
the international community was not doing all it could to reunite the province with the rest of the 
Congo.  
When Hammarskjold spoke of the UN’s support for independent Africa in his 
introduction to the UN’s 1960 Annual Report, he also said that the UN would build on the best 
elements of the African countries to do so. What actually happened in the Congo was less the 
UN building on elements and more the UN selecting which elements it wanted to work with and 
removing those it saw as an obstacle to its aims. However, the way in which the UN went about 
doing this was subtle because more often than not it involved actively choosing to not intervene. 
The UN used its policy of not interfering in internal affairs when it was a convenient excuse 
preventing it from taking forcible actions against the Belgians, which is what happened under 
Bunche’s leadership. Under Cordier, the UN saw that it was in its interests to work with the 
Americans and directly intervene in the Congo’s affairs to bring about Lumumba’s downfall. 
When Dayal led ONUC during the last months of Lumumba’s life, Hammarskjold specifically 
chose not to intervene to save Lumumba, tacitly implicating the UN in Lumumba’s death at the 
hands of the Belgians.  
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Though the US was an influential member of the UN, the Security Council debates 
demonstrate there were countries that supported the Congo against the Belgians and the 
Americans. Hammarskjold was also a powerful diplomat and a skilled negotiator whose actions 
and opinions carried significant weight in the international community. By the time both the US 
and Belgium chose to actually pursue assassination as a means of removing Lumumba from the 
political scene, both countries were well aware that Hammarskjold felt that Lumumba was 
working against the interests of the UN in the Congo. While it may never be possible to know to 
what extent Hammarskjold’s support was critical for the assassination plans against Lumumba, 
what is known is that UN support was critical in facilitating Lumumba’s assassination. The 
building tensions between Lumumba and Bunche, Cordier’s decision to block Lumumba’s 
access to the radio station to communicate with his supporters, and Dayal and Hammarskjold’s 
refusal to provide Lumumba with protection when he faced arrest at the hands of his foes were 
all actions taken by the highest ranking UN officials that led to Lumumba’s downfall and 
continued political instability in the Congo. The UN did not passively support the actions of the 
Belgians and the Americans working against Lumumba, but rather made active choices to 
intervene or not intervene at critical moments that allowed the Belgians and the Americans to 
manipulate the political situation in the Congo against Lumumba.  
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